(Note March 3, 2007: I've edited this post after posting it earlier today.)
A number of years ago, before I read Peirce, I had scoured Roget's Thesaurus and come up with four time orientations of affectivity:
(The fourth one I called not "attachment" but "fondness" in the same sense.)
To these I correlated, also scouring Roget's Thesaurus:
(By "fancy" I meant something like imagination but possibly focused on one's actual setting or on some part of it.)
The times were ones which I which I came to align with special relativity's light cone:
1. One's direct
And to those sequences I correlated (again with RT's help):
1. Concept, percept, etc.
2. Belief, Suspicion etc.
Later, I read Peirce and, after some time, came to have some grasp of his object-sign-interpretant triad and his views on collateral experience.
So then it seemed natural to me to correlate as follows:
4. Recognition, verification, corroboration, legitimation, etc.
1. Conception, percept-formation, etc.
3. Inference to a concept, percept, etc.
4. Inference to a judgment.
I added the proviso that "knowledge" should be understood fallibilistically, and one should think in terms of "knowing something as..." just as one sometimes says "I remember him as being such-&-such." Now I wonder whether those phrasings are a bit of cheating. Anyway, I would say technically that knowledge is that which is sufficiently well confirmed that it can be fairly regarded as hardly worth further special efforts at confirmation. This is somewhat subtly yet decidedly different from treating "knowledge" as an achievement word meaning that p is true and that one believes p.
I've suspected that one of the reasons that some misunderstand the Pragmatic Maxim to mean that a conception's meaning consists in the actual consequences of its object (or even of the conception itself), is that there isn't room made in the object-sign-interpretant triad for a verificational stage. So the interpretant gets regarded in that way, obscuring its clarificatory rather than verificational character.
Verification, corroboration, validation, etc., involve experience of the object (or something verifiably counting as the object), and so are not interpretation or construal but instead are collateral to interpretation and representation in respect of the object, yet still for that very reason have a determinational role in logical processes, or at least so I claim. The two most common responses from others have been (1) that verification etc. can be reduced to relations of object, sign, interpretant, and, contrarily, (2) that verification etc. aren't semiotic per se and don't have an essential determinational role in logical processes. The first response depends on shifting the given logical frame of reference during examples. The second response leads me to ask, if logic (deductive and non-deductive) isn't about verification and arranging for verifiability, then what is it about? It would be like trying to make beef stew without beef. If confirmation and disconfirmation determine nothing in a supposedly inferential process, then said process is incapable of learning and is non-inferential. I've passed more than a smidgen of time in such arguments. Not wasted time, though; at least, not yet.
|Timeward modes of affectivity.||Desire.||Hope.||Delight.||Attachment.|
|Timeward modes of cognition.||Fancy.||Expectation, Anticipation.||Noticing.||Memory.|
|Times.||One's almost-now||One's unambiguously later.||One's just-now.||One's unambiguously earlier.|
|Logical psychological states.||Concept, percept, etc.||Belief, suspicion, etc.||Understanding.||Knowledge.|
|Logical psychological acts.||Conception, percept-formation, etc.||Judgment.||Inference to a concept, percept, etc.||Inference to a judgment.|