Pragmatic Maxim variations

Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then the whole of our conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of the object. --The Pragmatic Maxim as stated by C.S. Peirce, 1878.

Should the involvement of the word "conceivable" be seen to depend on the Pragmatic Maxim's being concerned with the clarification of a conception? Does the pragmatic clarification of a belief proceed in terms of believable experiences with believable practical bearing? (I mentioned this more or less in the affirmative at the peirce-l email forum on August 18, 2006 http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/1310 and August 22, 2006 http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/1333).

Let's try it:

• Consider what effects, which might believably have practical bearings, we believe the object of our belief to have. Then the whole of our belief about those effects is the whole of our belief about the object.
  
• Consider what effects, which might understandably have practical bearings, we understand the object of our understanding to have. Then the whole of our understanding of those effects is the whole of our understanding of the object.
  
• Consider what effects, which might knowably have practical bearings, we know the object of our knowledge to have. Then the whole of our knowledge of those effects is the whole of our knowledge of the object.

Does it work?

It appears to me that the idea of "might" should be varied correspondingly. Something like "may believably have," "appear understandably to have," and "do knowably have." Be that as it may, the question remains, does the basic idea in this post work?

- posted by The Tetrast, initially @ 2/28/2007 07:18:00 AM [top of post] [top of page] Copyright © BenjaminðA.ðUde11.